Rawls ' Mature Theory of Social Justice An Introduction for Students © by Dr. Jan Garrett. for all material not otherwise attributed Latest Minor Revision ...
The economist Amartya Sen has raised concerns over Rawls' emphasis on primary social goods, arguing in Inequality Reexamined (1992) that we should attend not only to the distribution of primary goods, but also how effectively people are able to use those goods to pursue their ends.  Norman Daniels has wondered why health care shouldn't be treated as a primary good,  and some of his subsequent work has addressed this question, arguing for a right to health care within a broadly Rawlsian framework.  The philosopher Gerald Cohen , in If You're An Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich? (2000) and Rescuing Justice and Equality (2008), criticizes Rawls' avowal of inequality under the difference principle , his application of the principle only to social institutions, and what he sees as his obsession with the using primary goods as his currency of equality. 
There are three fundamental features of the representatives in the Original Position that reflect the two moral powers of which we spoke earlier. The first is that the representatives are rational in the sense that they wish to secure for those they represent the kind of goods that would enable them to work out (including to revise if necessary) their own conceptions of the good and then try to realize this good. This feature recognizes that each person has a set of interests which are his or her own. These interests are linked to the person's moral power to form, revise, and pursue a conception of the good; in the case of persons with a comprehensive doctrine, the interests will be linked to the comprehensive doctrine. The second fundamental feature of the representatives in the Original Position is summed up in the phrase The Veil of Ignorance . The representatives, unlike persons in the ideal society and unlike ourselves in a less than ideal society, stand behind the Veil of Ignorance. That is to say, they do not know the following about the persons they represent: their sex, race, physical handicaps, social class, or conception of the good. They rightly assume that the persons represented have these features but they do not know what it is. A third feature of the representatives in the Original Position is that they possess a great deal of common sense general knowledge about human psychology and sociology . They know, for instance, that humans remember the past, anticipate the future, and interact with things and people in the present. They know that people have diverse talents and interests. They know that humans undertake projects of varying complexity--from traveling to a mall to raising a family to undertaking missionary work to fighting for social justice to undertaking medical research. They are aware of the general types of situations in which humans can find themselves (that people can be sick or healthy, rich or poor, educated or ignorant, skilled or unskilled, indebted or free from debt, in a healthy natural environment or a degraded one, enslaved or free, etc. Specifically they are aware of that persons possess the two moral powers. They are aware that persons have a conception of the good. The first and second features of the representatives in the Original Position correspond to the two moral powers. Our capacity to frame and pursue a conception of the good is reflected in the rationality of the representatives who choose for us in order to optimize our ability to investigate and pursue the good. Our capacity for a sense of justice is reflected in the operation of the Veil of Ignorance. The Veil of Ignorance is what makes their imaginary choices on our behalf fair. 9. Expounding the Principles of Justice from the Idea of the Original Position As stated above, our representatives in the Original Position are given the task of selecting principles of justice that will govern the basic structure of society. To show briefly how they will reason, let us consider whether they would choose a principle of equal opportunity, say, a principle that would make economic discrimination on the basis of race, gender, or religion unjust. Recall that they do not know specifics about the individual persons they represent but they are committed to optimizing the interests of those persons. The best way to achieve this would be to rule out discrimination on the basis of race, gender, or religion. For if discrimination were permitted, then persons at stage (2) who have (and know they have) a specific race, or gender, or religion would find themselves at a disadvantage. They would be denied economic opportunities, and thus they would be prevented, to some extent at least, from pursuing as effectively as they otherwise might their conception of the good. (We assume that pursuit of the good, however one conceives it, requires resources.) 10. The Two Principles of Justice Rawls offers his notion of justice as fairness as an illustration of a political conception of justice. In its mature form (PL 291), this notion affirms the following principles : I. Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all, II. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions. First, they must be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.
Rawls argues that society should be structured in such a way that would allow similarly able people to have similar life chances; the purpose of this ethics class from day one is to figure out and discuss what's right and wrong to determine what might be an unethical action: killing one to save two people on a boat is wrong. Others have the greatest verse the least, in that you are allowed to make laws if they benefit the greatest. Yet other views say that society should let all people in society be equal, so yes I can say that after reading the case for equality does stimulate me; because I believe to have a greater amount of freedom, you must have less fairness and equality. To have a greater amount of fairness, you must have less freedom and equality. To have a greater amount of equality, you must have less freedom and fairness. Take, for example, economic equality. If it is going to be possible